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1. Taxation: What is and What Ought to be
Which formal requirements ensure that fiscal policy adheres to a standard of
justice? This query has two implications: that current tax policies fail standards
of justice and, more fundamentally, that “justice” delivers us a basis for the nor-
mative assessment of tax policy. This article critically examines these assumptions.
Taxation is an essential aspect of government action that can be used to attain
various goals. The basic justification, about which we can presume there is
widespread consensus, concerns the sponsoring of public goods provided by levies
that adhere to some standard of fairness or efficiency.1 Additionally, the literature
promotes taxation to achieve goals such as environmental protection, employment
stimulation, health protection, and the correction of all sorts of market failures.2
Whether one takes the first, minimalist, stance or attributes more extensive policy
goals to public authorities, Western tax systems fail to live up to their raison d’être.
Tax lawyers, economists, and philosophers3 generally recognize that the structure
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1. Peter Dietsch & Thomas Rixen, “Tax Competition and Global Background Justice” (2014)
22:2 J Political Philosophy 150 at 152; James M Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty:
Between Anarchy and Leviathan (Liberty Fund, 2000). By “consensus” I mean that nearly
all people “at least” accept this task. The field of public finance, however, traditionally goes
further by including all four. See Harvey S Rosen, “Public Finance” in Charles Rowley &
Friedrich Schneider, eds, The Encyclopedia of Public Choice (Springer US, 2004). James
Buchanan famously limits the task of the state to the minimalist stance, which he calls “the
protective state.”
2. Rosen, Public Finance, supra note 1; Stuart Adam et al, Dimensions of Tax Design (Oxford
University Press, 2010).
3. Reuven S Avi-Yonah, “Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare
State” (2000) 113:7 Harv L Rev 1573; Monica Bhandari, “Introduction to Philosophical
Foundations of Tax Law” in Monica Bhandari, ed, The Philosophical Foundations of Tax
Law (Oxford University Press, 2017); Joseph Bankman & David Shaviro, “Piketty in
America: A Tale of Two Literatures” (2015) 68 Tax L Rev 453; Allison Christians, “Putting
the Reign Back in Sovereign: Advice for the Second Obama Administration” (2013) 40:5
Pepp L Rev 1373; Shu-Yi Obei & Leigh Osofsky, “Constituencies and Control in Statutory
Drafting: Interviews with Government Tax Counsels” (2019) 104 Iowa L Rev 1291; Allison
Christians, “Trust in the Tax System” in Bruno Peeters, Hans Gribnau & Jo Badisco, eds,
Building Trust in Taxation (Intersentia, 2017) 151; Dietsch & Rixen, “Tax Competition”, supra
note 1; Peter Essers, “International Tax Justice Between Machiavelli and Habermas” in Bruno
Peeters, Hans Gribnau & Jo Badisco, eds, Building Trust in Taxation (Intersentia, 2017) 235;
Ave-Geidi Jallai, “Restoring Stakeholders’ Trust in Multinationals’ Tax Planning Practices with
Corporate Social Responsibility” in Bruno Peeters, Hans Gribnau & Jo Badisco, eds, Building
Trust in Taxation (Intersentia, 2017) 173; Willem Lemmens & Jo Badisco, “Taxation and
Ethics: An Impossible Marriage?” in Bruno Peeters, Hans Gribnau & Jo Badisco, eds,
Building Trust in Taxation (Intersentia, 2017) 119; Adam et al, Dimensions of Tax Design,
supra note 2; Bruno Peeters, Hans Gribnau & Jo Badisco, “Preface” in Bruno Peeters, Hans
Gribnau & Jo Badisco, eds, Building Trust in Taxation (Intersentia, 2017) v; Christiaan Vos,
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of prevailing tax systems does not adhere to taxation’s normative foundations. The
legitimacy crisis associated with tax law that “becomes increasingly unresponsive
to legitimate policy goals and increasingly out of touch with justice”4 has recently
attracted attention within the tax literature.5 One of the driving observations here is
indeed the interplay between private groups and policymakers and the emergent
fiscal exceptionalism and the complexity of the system.6
In this regard, Richter et al find a correlation between tax lobbying and the
effective tax rate: when US firms increase their lobbying expenditures by 1% in a
given year, they reduce their effective tax rates by an average of 0.5 to 1.6 percentage
points the following year.7 Another study confirms that fiscal lobbying is currently
one of the most profitable businesses: Alexander et al estimate the return on
investment from political influence on the US Job Creation Act (2004) to be
as high as 22,000%, meaning that every dollar invested in lobbying yields a return
of $220.8 Brown et al found that investing in relationships with tax policymakers
(e.g., via political action committee support) results in future tax benefits.9
Various sources like the UK’s House of Commons Committee of Public
Accounts10 and the Corporate Europe Observatory11 show that there is systematic
entanglement between legislators and the private interests of wealthy individuals
“Conflict of Trust: EU Member States’ Fiscal Sovereignty and the Ideal of the Internal Market”
in Bruno Peeters, Hans Gribnau & Jo Badisco, eds, Building Trust in Taxation (Intersentia, 2017)
89; Gabriel Wollner, “Justice in Finance: The Normative Case for an International Financial
Transaction Tax” (2014) 22:4 J Political Philosophy 458.
4. Christians, “Trust in the Tax System”, supra note 3 at 152.
5. This involved a certain shift, as the tax literature neglected political reality for a long time. The
standard texts on public economics do not mention the issues of fiscal complexity or the in-
fluence of lobbying. A shift toward a normative assessment of existing tax systems was partly
generated by the 2008-2010 economic and financial crisis and the subsequent fiscal crises in
several European countries, which provoked a stricter form of fiscal orthodoxy, with a more
stringent monitoring of compliance by taxpayers. At the same time, events like Swissleaks,
Luxleaks, and the Panama Papers and Paradise Papers have revealed that many multinationals
and wealthy individuals use various legal techniques to avoid paying national taxes. Lastly,
and connected, the field of taxation has gained popularity through an increased interest in eco-
nomic inequality via the popularity of Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the 21st Century. The in-
terest in the legitimacy of prevailing tax systems is mirrored in a number of contributions in
Bhandari, “Introduction to Philosophical Foundations of Tax Law”, supra note 3, and in
Building Trust in Taxation, supra note 3, in a number of contributions.
6. Binh Tran-Nam& Chris Evans, “Towards the Development of a Tax System Complexity Index”
(2014) 35:3 Fiscal Studies 341; Walter Hettich & Stanley L Winer, Democratic Choice and
Taxation: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis (Cambridge University Press, 1999) at 90.
7. Brian Kelleher Richter, Krislert Samphantharak & Jeffrey Timmons, “Lobbying and Taxes”
(2009) 53:4 American J Political Science 893.
8. Raquel Alexander, Susan Scholz & Stephen Mazza, “Measuring Rates of Return for Lobbying
Expenditures: An Empirical Analysis Under the American Jobs Creation Act” (2009) 25 JL &
Pol 401.
9. Jennifer L Brown, Katharine D Drake & Laura Wellman, “The Benefits of a Relational
Approach to Corporate Political Activity: Evidence from Political Contributions to Tax
Policymakers” (2015) 37:1 J American Taxation Association 69.
10. House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, “Tax Avoidance: The Role of Large
Accountancy Firms” (April 26, 2013), online: https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/
committees-a-z/commons-select/public-accounts-committee/inquiries/parliament-2010/tax-
avoidance-role-large-tax-accountancy-firms-follow-up/.
11. David Lundy, “Lobby Planet Brussels: The Corporate Europe Observatory Guide to the Murky
World of EU Lobbying (June 2017), online: https://corporateeurope.org/lobbyplanet.
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and corporations (so-called proactive tax planning) through big accounting or
lobbying firms. The Center for Responsive Politics12 confirms the interaction
between public lawmaking and private interests, for instance by revealing that
38 out of 44 Apple lobbyists previously held government jobs. This policy struc-
ture might indicate why, in the last decade, there has been a rise in legislative
measures like the “excess profit” tax scheme, “patent boxes,” “controlled foreign
company,” “foreign tax credit,” and “active financing exemption,” which
help multinationals and wealthy individuals slash their global tax debt.
Furthermore, it is important to note that Western regimes have “democratized”
fiscal exemptions, and by converting large proportions of votes into political
power, many factions of the constituency have been happy recipients of fiscal
rewards, such as mortgage interest deductions, tax cuts on company cars, and
stock options.
Wagner, discussing the entanglement between private interest and fiscal
policy, states that “at this point, fiscal politics enters to generate the proverbial
flood of exceptions and exemptions that creates a tax code so large that no one
can read it and which creates nearly a unique tax liability for each taxpayer.”13
Tax lawyer Allison Christians describes the state of affairs as follows: “Special
interests consistently exert influence on tax policy discourse through their
advisors and within a broad spectrum of discrete and pooled capacities. This
results in tax policy as favorable as possible to those who have the resources
to shape it.”14 Hargreaves Heap connects the emerging complexity with a failure
to achieve any public policy goals: “About the only thing we can say with much
confidence about our currently complex tax systems is that they spawn an indus-
try of tax accountants, lawyers and lobbyists who game the system for the benefit
of their clients, who are mainly rich.”15
But why would this specific interaction between the division of tax liability
and private interest fail the standard of justice? I employ a contractarian-
constitutionalist perspective on justice, according to which the fundamental
rules and institutions that form the basis of the state need to be understood as
part of an exchange of agreements between participating members of society.16
The essential test that the prevailing basic political institutions face is
whether they could have been contracted by (rather than imposed on) rational
12. Profile for 2016 Election Cycle (Apple Inc), Center for Responsive Politics (November 23,
2017), online: https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=D000021754.
13. Richard E Wagner, Politics as a Peculiar Business: Insights From a Theory of Entangled
Political Economy (Edward Elgar, 2016) at 142.
14. Christians, “Trust in the Tax System”, supra note 3 at 152.
15. Shaun P Hargreaves Heap, “Behavioural Public Policy” (2017) 1:2 Behavioural Public Policy
252 at 259.
16. Geoffrey Brennan, “Politics-as-Exchange and “The Calculus of Consent”” (2012) 152 Public
Choice 351 at 351-52; Roger D Congleton, “The Contractarian Constitutional Political
Economy of James Buchanan” (2014) 25:1 Constitutional Political Economy 39 at 44-45
[Congleton, “The Contractarian”]; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised ed (Belknap
Press, 1999) at 3, 10; James M Buchanan & Roger D Congleton, Politics by Principle,
Not Interest: Towards Nondiscriminatory Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 1998)
at 4 [Buchanan & Congleton, Politics by Principle].
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individuals.17 Moreover, individuals in a setting of constitutional choice
accept limitations on their liberty (i.e., rules that involve coercion) when doing
so advances their interests, and this exchange makes them better off.18 As
constitutional choice revolves around rules with a general and quasi-permanent
application, contracting individuals are relatively uncertain regarding their future
position under the different choice options and thus of the personal effect of
various alternatives.19 Choosing behind a “veil of uncertainty,” no party is able
to tailor its specific position and unanimous agreement is likely to revolve around
rules but these components are also generalized criteria of “fairness” and
“efficiency.”20 This does not require a rule that each participant has to win simul-
taneously.21 Rather, over the whole set of political actions, its working properties
must be “broadly acceptable”22 regardless of participants’ specific positions, for
instance in terms of political power.
Looking through this constitutional window, tax policy, at least in the United
States and Europe, embodies an “anything goes” regime, a political jungle in
which well-organized subgroups of society are successfully fighting for
controversial privileges at the expense of (the welfare of) their fellow citizens.
A constitutional choice, however, would never select procedures that enable
subsets of the constituency to realize “fiscal gains” at the expense of those outside
the ruling coalition.23 Choosing rules behind a veil of uncertainty, constitutional
contractors have no accurate knowledge about their position in the future political
game, so unanimity will be reached around rules that lead to outcomes “all can
live with.”24 Given this perspective of justice, I investigate the requirements for
political rulemaking in order to shield the resulting policy from manipulation
by affluent organizations and multinationals (who “buy” the policy they find
profitable), more modest economic parties (which extract public resources via
17. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 16 at 16.
18. Brennan, “Politics-as-Exchange”, supra note 16 at 352; Congleton, “The Contrarian”, supra
note 16 at 44-45; John Rawls, Collected Papers, edited by Samuel Freeman (Harvard
University Press, 1999) [Rawls, Collected Papers]; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note
16 at 12; Geoffrey Brennan & James M Buchanan, The Reason of Rules (Liberty Fund,
2000) at 27 [Brennan & Buchanan, The Reason of Rules].
19. Rawls, Collected Papers, supra note 18 at 58; Brennan & Buchanan, The Reason of Rules,
supra note 18 at 35; FA Hayek, The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents—The
Definitive Edition, edited by Bruce Caldwell (University of Chicago Press, 2007) at 113
[Hayek, The Road to Serfdom]. The moral justification of this paper is contractarian, and hence
Rawlsian, in the sense that the rules that are just are those that would be chosen within the
setting of constitutional choice. The specific constitutional setting, however, is Buchananite
rather than Rawlsian: see Part 3.1. of this paper.
20. Buchanan & Congleton, Politics by Principle, supra note 16 at 6-7; James M Buchanan, The
Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty (Liberty Fund, 1999) at 146 [Buchanan, Logical
Foundations].
21. Brennan, “Politics-as-Exchange”, supra note 16 at 356.
22. Buchanan & Congleton, Politics by Principle, supra note 16 at 18; Brennan & Buchanan, The
Reason of Rules, supra note 18 at 35.
23. Congleton, “The Contractarian”, supra note 16 at 46.
24. John Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory” (1980) 77:9 J Philosophy 515 at 519
[Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism”].
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their influence over voting procedures), and politically well-organized economic
players (e.g., unions, farmers, and lawyers) that are close to the decision-making
process. Given the political reality as sketched at the start, and given the increas-
ing attention paid to the justice of Western tax systems, I explore the following
question:
Which procedural requirements can turn tax policy—currently a domain with
winners and losers and rules that reflect the self-interest of one group over that
of others—into a procedure that leads to outcomes that are acceptable to a wide
range of positions, including those outside the realm of power?
The rest of this article is divided into three parts. Section 2 sets up a behav-
ioral model that analyzes the legislative dynamics arising under a simplified
version of our current tax system. In particular, tax exemptions under a weak
majority-rule requirement are expected to lead to fiscal exploitation, inefficient
public spending, and rising general taxation levels. Section 3 investigates
how the constitution can protect the legislative machinery from penetration
by specific interests and shape the legislative stage to be more oriented toward
the goals of all citizens. In particular, I argue that in order to liberate taxation
from fiscal exploitation and to reconcile taxation and public finance with the
general interest, taxation should follow the precepts of generality, of which
tax uniformity is the best account. The conclusive section connects the findings
of this article with traditional theories of justice and explains the nature of a
nonideal and procedural view on justice.
2. The Political Economics of Tax Exemptions
Looking at how to improve real-world decision processes in fiscal matters,
recommendations of justice commence with a descriptive analysis.25 If we want
to carry the requirements of justice to the political level, we need to trace the
empirical elements that characterize political reality.26 Modeling the political
world that is actually deciding on the issue at stake requires taking into account
at least two matters. First, distributive decisions are never unilateral choices.
In democracies, the division of fiscal obligations “emerges” from a complex
interaction of various individuals.27 The second aspect is that these parties
are self-interested. Though a thorough description of the controversial tax
rules that typify our current tax codes is beyond the scope of this article, the
introduction reveals that individuals and groups adopt various strategies to
influence fiscal politics in order to acquire private gains.28 The introduction of
25. John Thrasher, “Ordering Anarchy” (2014) 5 Rationality, Markets and Morals 30.
26. Buchanan, Logical Foundations, supra note 20 at 133.
27. Brennan, “Politics-as-Exchange”, supra note 16 at 352; Brennan & Buchanan, The Reason of
Rules, supra note 18 at 19, 128.
28. Eamonn Butler, Public Choice (The Institute of Economic Affairs, 2012) at 77.
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the “self-interestedness assumption” within the fiscal process29 means two
things.30 First, concerning benefits (i.e., public spending), the members of a
society are expected to influence the political process to acquire the type of
public goods they desire and to maximize the amount.31 Second, in terms of costs
(i.e., taxation), people will avoid expenses they do not want and try to minimize
their liabilities. This necessarily means that, under the assumption that their
consumption of public goods remains equal, citizens will try to minimize their
tax share.32
2.1. Legislative Patterns under a Simplified Majority Constraint
In my search for the proper constraints for rulemaking, the following step
models how individuals will behave under one type of fiscal decision rule.
Moreover, I focus on a much-celebrated constraint in Western politics: the
majority requirement. Under this requirement, for a tax policy to be legitimate,
it needs to be approved by a majority of the voters. The operation of fiscal exemp-
tions under this requirement deserves particular attention. As was done in
Buchanan and Tullock’s Calculus of Consent and later work33 from which I draw
inspiration, I employ four simplifications.34 First, I assume a situation of direct
democracy, in the sense that each citizen can vote on the legislation in question.
This enables us to avoid dealing with the specific complexities of representative
democracy, which are touched upon under 2.2. Second, I assume no constitu-
tional control over the produced legislation: I isolate the emerging patterns under
the majority rule. Third, I assume that a strict spending policy prevails: the
production of public goods creates an equal value for each citizen. So, I focus
on the taxing part of the “fiscal exchange.”35 Lastly, in order to focus on the
particular incentives that different groups face, I limit the imaginary polity to
29. James D Gwartney, Public Choice and Constitutional Economics, edited by Richard E Wager
(Jai Press, 1988) at 7; James M Buchanan & Richard A Musgrave, Public Finance and Public
Choice: Two Contrasting Visions of the State (MIT Press, 1999).
30. Note that this does not mean that individuals have no other motivations. All that is required for
studies of different consequences of different rules is that self-interest is one among several
motivational factors. To focus on how different rules create different outcomes given the self-
interested postulate, we are required to isolate the former and thus model individuals as being
uniquely self-interested.
31. James M Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of
Constitutional Democracy (Liberty Fund, 1999) at 132 [Buchanan & Tullock, Calculus of
Consent].
32. Buchanan & Congleton, Politics by Principle, supra note 16 at 90.
33. Buchanan & Congleton, Politics by Principle.
34. Buchanan & Tullock, Calculus of Consent, supra note 31 at 132-49.
35. Buchanan also isolates the funding part of the exchange from the expenditure. For instance,
Buchanan & Tullock, ibid at 137, focus on spending decisions by a majority under the
presumption of an equal property tax on all citizens. See also Buchanan and Brennan, The
Reason of Rules, supra note 18. Nonetheless, I acknowledge the two-sidedness of the fiscal
account; i.e., that taxation is part of public economics sensu latu, and that the justice of taxation
depends on the consequent distribution of public goods among the constituency. See, for
instance, Buchanan, Logical Foundations, supra note 20 at 133-49.
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three political and economic groups.36 How this stark and simplified model is
valid for understanding real-world problems, as mentioned in the introduction,
is discussed in Section 3.2.
Imagine now the following situation: A township has liberated itself from
external dominance and is free to organize its own public system. Its spending
policy is assumed to generate an equal amount of goods (for instance, security,
general road maintenance, or a basic income) for each citizen.37 The township’s
funding decisions are to be decided by an unrestrained majority rule: policies that
are supported by more than half of the inhabitants (i.e., 51%) are implemented.
The township has an economic product of 100,000 and can be socioeconomically
divided into three subgroups: 20 entrepreneurs, each of whom earns 2,000
(40,000 total); 20 fishermen (earning 1,750 each or 35,000 total) and 20 workers
(1,250 each or 25,000 total). For reasons of simplicity, I assume no economic
growth. Due to the inheritance of previous legislation, a flat tax of 20% currently
prevails; it raises 20,000 for the government. Governmental activity is not purely
redistributive but produces genuine “public” goods, meaning their consumption
creates a benefit for each citizen. The value of the public goods is estimated at
23,000. Given the assumption of an equal benefit throughout the constituency,
this means we assume a gross value of 383 per capita.
From a public choice perspective, the levying part of this fiscal exchange
would be particularly unstable. Ab initio, the entrepreneurs, workers, and fish-
ermen all agree to taxation to provide some public goods: they all calculate
some public provision of security, general road maintenance, or a basic income
to exceed possible costs. However, this initial prospectus gets trumped by the
opportunity to offset the costs onto the minority. While all parties could benefit
from cooperation, each individual party could benefit maximally by shifting the
costs of the public goods onto the other party. The sketch of various coalitions
hereunder is indicative, for successive cycles of majorities, which can be
predicted to minimize their tax debt by using fiscal exemptions, will tend to
emerge.
A first coalition is made between the fishermen and the workers (see Table 1).
Forming a government—called “labor”—they put the general tax up to 22% (ex-
acting 8,800 from the entrepreneurs) but lower taxation for themselves to 19%.
The general revenue during coalition labor is now 20,200, but the members of the
majority contribute proportionally less.
After a four-year term, the entrepreneurs manage to convince the workers to
form a new alliance, called “freedom” (see Table 2). They increase general taxa-
tion to 25% (extracting 8,750 from the fishermen), but “in order for the economy
to prosper,” they opt for specific measures: the workers (4,750) maintain the tax
break from labor, but the entrepreneurs (7,600) get a “freedom break” of up to
19% and can henceforth minimize their fiscal costs. Due to the extra
36. Buchanan & Congleton, Politics by Principle, supra note 16 at 30.
37. For reasons of simplicity, I also assume they realize the same subjective value from this con-
sumption of public goods.
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contributions from the minority, overall revenue increases, but this only causes a
small increase in spending value, to 23,500, or 391 per capita.
The next term is ruled by a new coalition between the fishermen and the
workers (see Table 3). Their project is called “social justice.” To raise the level
of basic income, they put a “fairness tax” of 32% (12,800) on entrepreneurs, and
the fishermen (7,000) and workers (5,000) get a “fairness exemption” down
to 20%. The additional revenue—now 24,800—creates a value of 24,000, or
400 per capita. Collective action is a societal loss but is profitable for members
of the majority, who pay 12,000 but consume 16,000.38 This is in sharp contrast
with the entrepreneurs, who pay 12,800 but consume only 8,000.
Before the township loses its sovereignty due to bad economic results and
internal struggles over fiscal issues, a final coalition, called “green,” is made
between entrepreneurs and fishermen (see Table 4). Their tax program abolishes
both the “fairness exemption” for workers and the higher basic income and
Table 1. Coalition Labor
Group Outcome from Public Action
Workmen 145.5
Fishermen 50.5
Entrepreneurs –57
Table 2. Coalition Freedom
Group Outcome from Public Action
Workmen 154
Fishermen –46
Entrepreneurs 11.5
Table 3. Coalition Social Justice
Group Outcome from Public Action
Workmen 150
Fishermen 50
Entrepreneurs –240
38. I do not wish to “prove” that collective action needs to be a collective loss under these
institutional arrangements. All that the coalition “social justice” shows is that it is possible
that such is the case, as the majority can make profits while the overall utility is negative.
For more discussion, see points 2 and 3 hereafter, within this section.
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introduces a general “environmental tax” of 35% (extracting 8,750 from the
workers). However, to give entrepreneurs the leeway to adopt new ecological
techniques, they get a tax break of 22% (8,800). The fishermen (7,000) are able
to retain their “fairness exemption” in this government. These fiscal measures do
not create any surplus, and the value of public spending falls back to 23,000 (383
per capita). At this stage, public policy ceases to be beneficial, even for the ma-
jority, since it consumes 15,333 but contributes 15,800. Nonetheless, the coali-
tion is soothed by the facts that the fishermen maintain their tax breaks and the
entrepreneurs better their situation sharply: whereas they lost 4,800 under the
“social justice” scenario (paid 12,800, consumed 8,000), this cost is now
minimized to 1,134.
These cycles of coalitions are no pure “prediction” of reality. The specific
numbers—for instance the income level of each group and the rates that they will
opt for—can and will differ in reality. However, this example is indicative of
particular policy patterns that will occur to a greater or lesser extent when
self-interested parties act under a weak majoritarian restraint:
1. Since there is no substantive constraint, each party is tempted by a “take-all”
scenario. Under the hypothesis of an equal benefit model, self-interested
agents are incentivized to engage in fiscal exploitation, meaning they build
coalitions until a majority has been formed and realize profits by transferring
the cost of public goods to the minority.39 This is exemplified by the labor
coalition (Table 1).
2. This dynamic leads to a situation in which Pareto-inferior public activities
become profitable for majority coalitions.40 Since the (fiscal) revenue
exceeds the spending value, at the societal level, collective action is loss-
making for the community. Nonetheless, as the fiscal burden can be shifted
onto those out of power—i.e., there is fiscal exploitation—public action
continues to be cost-effective for those in government. This is illustrated
by the “social justice” coalition (Table 3).
3. The practice of discriminatory taxation generates poor spending decisions.41
When judging incremental public investments, the ruling majority will
Table 4. Coalition Green
Group Outcome from Public Action
Workmen –54.5
Fishermen 33
Entrepreneurs –57
39. Buchanan & Tullock, Calculus of Consent, supra note 31.
40. Ibid at 141-42, 168; Gwartney, supra note 29 at 18.
41. Buchanan & Tullock, Calculus of Consent, supra note 31 at 166; Gerald Gaus, The Order of
Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World
(Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 544 [Gaus, The Order of Public Reason].
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appreciate only its own marginal costs. Since these costs can be minimized
due to externalization via tax exemptions, there is an incentive for deficit
spending. For instance, the tax reform from the “social justice” coalition
is not profitable, as total revenue (24,800) exceeds total spending value
(24,000), yet it appears so for the majority (see Table 3).
The image of majoritarian winners and minoritarian losers is only part of
the picture. When we take into account the occurrence of various cycles, the
institutionalization of tax benefits as exemplified by successive governments
creates a dynamic whereby over time everybody loses—even those in the
majority.42 Moreover, everybody will be in the minority at some point and thus
become subject to fiscal extraction. What is more, the game established by tax
exemptions under a weak majoritarian constraint creates a “downward spiral.”As
mentioned by Hayek43 and Gaus,44 majorities lack incentives to explicitly
consider the long-term significance of their decisions. In the competitive and
aggressive competition for tax exemptions, the biggest threat is being in the
minority.45 Shortsightedness is rational, and the agents of each successive gov-
ernment have a strong incentive to transfer the burden onto others. In the long
run, this “rational” succession of tax exemptions, ever-rising tax rates, and public
overinvestment (due to the externalization of costs) could render the provision of
public goods a negative-sum game, leading to a situation in which all members
will lose in absolute terms, though they will lose relatively different amounts.46
Within each “game” (i.e., one-shot majoritarian coalitions), parties will compare
their tax level with what it was in the former government and with that of
the other group rather than with point 0 or some economic optimum. Within a
dynamic perspective, this leads to the point at which majorities do not even
gain in absolute terms, but simply profit by avoiding an even bigger loss.
Public policy, instead of creating advantages for each member, turns into a game
of cost minimization. This is illustrated by the “green” coalition (Table 4).
2.2. Legislative Patterns in a Complex Majoritarian Democracy
Why would rational participants be hopelessly trapped in the game? After
all, individuals have a certain interest in avoiding fiscal exploitation, as
they are aware that political gain in this round can be met with severe
extraction in the next one.47 The incentive to overcome the dilemma is strength-
ened by the long-term destructive effects of exploitative majorities. Indeed,
42. Ibid at 542; Gwartney, supra note 29 at 19.
43. FA Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty: The Definitive Edition, ed by Ronald Hamowy
(University of Chicago Press, 2011).
44. Gerald F Gaus, On Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (Cengage Learning, 2008) at 195
[Gaus, On Philosophy].
45. Buchanan & Congleton, supra note 16 at 91.
46. Gaus, The Order of Public Reason, supra note 41 at 545.
47. Brennan & Buchanan, The Reason of Rules, supra note 18 at 135.
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empirical work48 suggests that groups are actually creative and often solve
social dilemmas by setting up complex arrangements that monitor and sanction
the use of common resources. For two reasons, prevailing politics do not solve
the conflict. Emergent individual strategies are determined by the number of
individuals. Because of the intimate relationship between one’s own behavior
and the expected choices of others, small groups foster cooperation.49 However,
with an increase in the size of the group, individuals become anonymous parts
of big entities and realize that their own “ethical” choices do not increase the
probability that others will follow the norm.50 Hence, the possibility of
enforcing cooperative strategies through social interaction diminishes starkly
in a polity of millions of people.51 The incentive to defect further increases
as the number of factions grows. In a three-group game, the fiscal duty of
each party and the costs of fiscal exploitation are both identifiable and substan-
tial. As society becomes more complex, majority legislation is expected to take
the form of a compromise between various successful groups and to involve
adopting a list of tax benefits that result in huge profits for the beneficiaries
and small costs for everyone else.52 Self-governance through communication
and informal sanctioning becomes highly unlikely in a complex legal order
in which an interminable range of exemptions, obtained by unidentifiable
individuals, exerts marginal and incalculable costs on the total group.53 This
effect is exacerbated by the institution of representative democracy, whereby
individuals secure their interests indirectly by trading votes for fiscal favors.54
This “exchange” decreases the chances of monitoring, as information
asymmetry results in a situation in which the vast majority has no knowledge
of the fiscal rules or their destructive effect.
So, reality is no doubt more complex than the model, but, unfortunately, not in
the sense that we could expect a solution to emerge endogenously. The behavior
of political agents and subsequent legislative patterns are functions of the rules
that define when a valid agreement has been reached.55 Moreover, any system in
which economic matters are decided by anything less than unanimity, in the
absence of any other constitutional requirement, creates the possibility of private
gains for some at the expense of others.56 Our model showed how in a direct
democracy, citizens themselves find partners with whom to build a majority that
adopts various fiscal privileges for the respective groups, the costs of which can
48. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation: Revised Edition (Basic Books, 2006); Elinor
Ostrom & Vincent Ostrom, Choice, Rules and Collective Action, edited by Paul Dragos
Aligica & Filippo Sabetti (ECPR Press, 2014) at 167.
49. Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner & James Walker, Rules, Games, and Common-pool Resources
(University of Michigan Press, 1994) at 319.
50. James M Buchanan, “Ethical Rules, Expected Values, and Large Numbers” (1965) 76 Ethics 1
at 9 [Buchanan, “Ethical Rules”].
51. Ostrom & Ostrom, supra note 48 at 190.
52. Butler, supra note 28 at 62.
53. Ostrom & Ostrom, supra note 48 at 181, 193.
54. Butler, supra note 28 at 58-59.
55. Brennan & Buchanan, The Reason of Rules, supra note 18 at 3.
56. Buchanan & Tullock, Calculus of Consent, supra note 31 at 85-96.
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be shifted to the rest of the constituency. The introduction described how, in a
representative democracy, citizens influence legislation indirectly, through their
exchanges with politicians. Rather than “a majority” dominating “a minority,”
representative democracy generates specific subgroups that influence majority
legislation in a highly unequal way.57 It is within this framework that we should
situate the political advantage for powerful lobby organizations and voting
groups with strategic importance (e.g., the median voter). The result is fiscal
legislation in the form of a laundry list of exemptions for all interest groups
decisive in the political process.
Whether consisting of two homogeneous blocks (as in the model under 2.1.)
or multiple smaller voting or lobby groups (as described in the introduction), our
analysis remains constant. The open-endedness of the majority rule regarding the
specific division of fiscal shares facilitates fiscal exploitation, meaning decisive
groups adopt various fiscal privileges, the costs of which will be shifted to the rest
of the constituency.58 This pressure for private gains from majoritarian proce-
dures helps us understand the prevailing fiscal institutions described by the
tax literature.59 In particular, the aggressive struggle for benefits, the emergence
of the booming lobbying industry, the segregation of the electorate into voting
blocs, the ability of small interest groups to capture concentrated benefits while
dispersing marginal costs, a chaotic tax code riddled with a maze of exemptions
and deductions, and the appearance of many loopholes are patterns generated by
an unrestrained majority rule. In the emergent state of legal anarchy, a general
distrust in (fiscal) politics complicates the situation even further.60
3. Tax Uniformity as a Constitutional Tool
3.1. The Quest for Justice: Enter the Constitutional Perspective
An unrestrained majority rule creates winners and losers, at best. This analysis
brings us back to our main aim: to create a sphere of fiscal politics that is
immunized against these exploitative activities and generates acceptable results
for all participants.61 While each member of the township might contribute to
fiscal exploitation at the political level, the constitutional level requires a system
of collective action that cultivates prosperity and promotes the overall interests of
all participants.62 To help answer our core question, it is useful to refocus on the
problematic case. Looking at both the township and current fiscal politics, there
are two crucial elements at work.
First, each player has knowledge of his or her own situation. The township and
our society are composed of interest groups that are formed around particular
57. Christians, “Trust in the Tax System”, supra note 3.
58. Buchanan & Tullock, Calculus of Consent, supra note 31 at 285-86.
59. Peeters, Gribnau & Badisco, “Preface”, supra note 3.
60. Ostrom & Ostrom, supra note 48 at 192.
61. Brennan, “Politics-as-Exchange”, supra note 16 at 353.
62. Buchanan & Tullock, Calculus of Consent, supra note 31 at 285; Thrasher, supra note 25 at 37.
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characteristics such as income and type of business. Economic characteristics are
prevalent, and members with equal legal (workers, entrepreneurs, functionaries,
or unemployed groups) or economic (earning power) status will coalesce into
separate political parties, factions within a party, lobby groups, or more
informal interest groups. Cartels will thus revolve around a shared characteristic,
which will form the benchmark for each faction to calculate the potential payoffs
of the political measures at stake. As evident in the situations of fiscal anarchy
described above, each group will isolate its situation in order to calculate its profit
on a particular issue.
The observation of this process relates to Rawls’s “veil of ignorance,” behind
which rational agents would be ignorant about their social position, income,
talent, ethnicity, or view of the good life.63 The “original position” distinguishes
itself from the township and our societies because, due to a lack of knowledge
regarding their own economic or ethical interests, individuals in the original
position cannot advance proposals tailored to their personal situation.64
Instead, these individuals are optimally positioned to choose the principles
of justice, meaning that “no one is able to design his principles to favor his
particular condition.”65 Rawls’s contribution indicates that from a contractarian-
constitutional perspective, procedures, where dominant partisan interests deter-
mine the division of the fiscal burden, are not acceptable.
Rawls models an imaginary constitutional choice process populated by
participants who are blinded on whether they are workmen, fishermen, or entre-
preneurs. Here, constitutional principles are chosen within a more realistic
contractual setting, in which participants are aware of whether they are workmen,
fishermen, or entrepreneurs. The veil of uncertainty is not generated by setting up
“imaginary subjects,” but rather by the nature of constitutional choice. Due to
their quasi-permanent nature, constitutional rules create relative uncertainty for
the individual with respect to his or her specific position under the operation
of the prospective alternatives and thus with respect to the precise effect of
the constitutional alternatives on his or her future situation.66 Logically uncertain
about their future position and the personal effect of various alternatives, contrac-
tors will search for constitutional rules that generate fiscal outcomes
acceptable to a broad range of positions.67 Another nuance relates to the content
63. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 16 at 11.
64. Gerald Gaus & John Thrasher, “Rational Choice and the Original Position” in Timothy Hinton,
ed, The Original Position (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 39 at 46.
65. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 16 at 11.
66. Buchanan & Congleton, Politics by Principle, supra note 16 at 6-7; Brennan & Buchanan, The
Reason of Rules, supra note 18 at 34.
67. In other words, in order to reveal the true principles of justice, Rawls employs “ignorance”—a
condition under which imaginary choosers have no knowledge of their own identity.
Buchanan’s “veil of uncertainty” (together with Brennan and later Congleton) creates a lower
yet more realistic level of uncertainty: uncertainty is introduced through the generality and the
quasi-permanence of constitutional rules. This test is more feasible, in the sense that in various
aspects of life, people are required to choose rules under conditions of uncertainty about their
specific effect on their position (e.g., when prospective partners vote on the operational rules of
a company or when we decide upon the rules of a party game). Remarkably, Rawls did not
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of the agreement. Whereas Rawls identifies the conclusive principle that ought to
regulate the distribution of economic shares in society, I examine which proce-
dural constraints could improve the democratic choice process when its members
are deciding on a distributive issue. Following Buchanan,68 desired end-state
distributions of income, for instance, those maximizing the amount of goods
for the least advantaged, do not represent the first aim, and the test that follows
will not impose a cardinal distributive formula. I merely aim to “discover”
practical procedures for democratic decision processes to promote outcomes that
are acceptable to all positions, irrespective of the substantial conception of justice
that will drive their future factions.69
While modeling decision-makers as ignorant of their position, talent, and view
of the good life is theoretically powerful, it remains a thought experiment: par-
ticipants deciding on the distribution of fiscal shares are not actually choosing
behind a veil of ignorance. Thus, while looking for procedural regulations
that could enhance the operation of real-world decision processes, collective
decisions will be made by people with knowledge of their own situations.
Nonetheless, a second element is at stake in real-life situations and in the
township. Not only do people tread on the political level with knowledge of
themselves, they also form cartels around rules that cover this particular situation.
What defines the individual calculus in the political arena is not only participants’
knowledge of themselves, but equally the responsiveness of legislation to this
situation. The type of legislation that emerges in the township—and in our current
tax codes—distinguishes between locational, professional, financial, industrial,
and behavioral elements. Indeed, where thought experiments rule out knowledge
regarding personal characteristics, these elements are brought into existing
politics as decisive yardsticks for the application of rules. It is one thing to accept
that people enter the political arena as real people, with knowledge of their
circumstances and goals, but it is quite another to accept that these particularities
are objectively embedded in the law as decisive conditions for the differential
application of a rule. This leaves us with one remaining possibility: cutting
the string on the rules side. The rule requirement that deserves attention is not
that rules are created by people who are ignorant of their characteristics, but rather
that the rules themselves do not refer to such characteristics and hence apply to all
members equally.70
always assume a veil of ignorance. In Rawls, “Justice as Fairness,” in Samual Freeman, ed,
Collected Papers (Harvard University Press, 1999) at 47-72, he characterizes the original
position as a setting in which players have full information of their circumstances. See also
Gaus & Thrasher, supra note 64; Buchanan, Logical Foundations, supra note 20 at 146 n 7.
68. Ibid at 146.
69. Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, “Constitutional Political Economy: The Political
Philosophy of Homo Economicus?” (1997) 3:3 J Political Philosophy 280 at 290-91.
70. Rawls, Collected Papers, supra note 18 at 54. Rawls, when employing a model affiliated
with the one here, equally stretched the importance of the requirement of generality: “ : : : each
person will propose principles of a general kind which will, to a large degree, gain their sense
from the various applications to be made of them, the particular circumstances of which being
as yet unknown.” Ibid. For an extensive elaboration, see Gaus & Thrasher, supra note 64 at 45.
Here I investigate the specific value of these kinds of requirements.
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3.2. The Virtues of Generality in Taxation
The range of options that arises when parties negotiate on legislation is a product
of the procedural rules that define a valid agreement. And a participant’s calculus
can be expected to revolve around such options that emerge on the horizon of
possible agreements. But what if the object of that calculus (i.e., prospective
legislation) is required to be indifferent to any personal, economic, or worldview-
like characteristics and to apply to all members of a given jurisdiction equally?
3.2.1. Generality as an ethical certificate
This generality requirement builds a minimal ethical standard into legislation.71 It
precludes the assignment of privileges, where those in charge take advantage of
their momentous power to promote only their liberty or restrict only the behavior
of others.72 Whereas majority rule will always imply that rulers have powers over
legal subjects, the constraint at stake assures that the rulers respect the notion of
formal equality—and thus create rules that apply to all members equally. The
type of agreements that will subsequently govern society will be reciprocal:
the legislative rights and duties will be distributed equally to both the majority
and minority. For instance, if an Islamophobic party wishes to limit Muslims’
freedom of speech, it has to limit freedom of speech for all worldviews equally.
The demand that governments and legislators formulate universal maxims rather
than discriminatory measures rules out the most severe forms of injustice that the
rather amoral majority rule could produce.73
3.2.2. The meaning of generality in tax matters
The normative demand to think of legislation that would be desirable as a
universal law is more than a pure deontic maxim. The fundamental precept that
decisions generated by the subset of persons that make up the government need to
“apply equally” to everybody is intended to promote the interests of those who
are outside that membership, alongside the contractarian-constitutional demands
outlined in the introduction. Nonetheless, the precise translation of generality
into tax matters remains unresolved.74 To engender outcomes acceptable to all
positions, decisive majorities can only pass tax rules that do not distinguish
between personal circumstances and apply equally throughout the constituency.75
But how do we operationalize that demand? Furthering on the dominance of
71. Rawls, Collected Papers, supra note 18 at 54. See “Justice as Fairness,” supra note 67
(“Having a morality must at least imply the acknowledgment of principles as impartially
applying to one’s own conduct as well as to another’s.”).
72. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 16 at 117.
73. Buchanan & Congleton, Politics by Principle, supra note 16 at 6.
74. Åsbørn Melkevik, “No Progressive Taxation Without Discrimination?” (2016) 27: 4
Constitutional Political Economy 418.
75. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, supra note 19 at 114.
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income taxation in many legal systems76 and hypothesizing on a broadly defined
tax base (i.e., one that includes all persons and forms of income), I analyze the
constraint that majorities “need to tax income equally”: what proposition
demands universal application here?77 I explore three options: (1) an equal rate,
asking the same proportion from each participant; (2) an equal absolute number,
asking the same amount of money from each participant; or (3) an equal progres-
sive structure, applying the same system of differentiated rates for different
income brackets to each participant. The alternative patterns in fiscal outcomes
this generates will be illustrated by going back to the township.
1. Tax uniformity
I define generality as tax uniformity or the equal-rate principle (rather than, for
instance, an equal absolute contribution or progressive rate structure). A majority
can impose any tax rule as long as it consists of a tax rate that applies to all mem-
bers’ incomes equally. Each faction is now determined to calculate its preferred
policy within the confines of a strictly uniform applied rate.
Figure 1 shows the consequence of the strict symmetrical distribution of tax
shares: a tax rate that is profitable for one group tends to create acceptable results
for other groups as well.
Table 5 depicts the feasible options for each group for a certain rate, under the
general observation of both increasing and decreasing value of public goods.
As discussed previously, under the unrestrained majority rule, an interminable
range of legislative measures can potentially produce payoffs for each group.
Moreover, each majority formed could literally “invent” endless legislation to
improve its situation. Table 5 reveals how the landscape of possible political
Figure 1. Distributive options under tax uniformity
76. Bhandari, supra note 3 at 1-9.
77. Indeed, the search for generality pertains not just to the applicable rate structure but depends
equally on the definition of “income.” If political agents have the legislative liberty to define
when taxable income occurs, the problems we aim to solve would reoccur within the confines
of our solution. Moreover, excluding some income from the tax base equals a tax exemption
of 0%. For a defense of a consistent and broadly defined tax base, see Charles Delmotte,
“The Right to Autonomy as a Moral Foundation for the Realization Principle in Income
Taxation” in Monica Bhandari, ed, The Philosophical Foundations of Tax Law (Oxford
University Press, 2017) 281.
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agreements for coalitions is sensibly limited by the uniformity restraint.
Moreover, uniformity demands strict symmetrical contributions from all mem-
bers: when a proportion of income is exacted from one member of society,
the same share will be imposed on other members. This crucially alters the leg-
islative dynamic in three ways:
1. The optimal tax rate for each group is not undetermined or dependent on
how much one can make others pay but appears a priori as a given number
(i.e., the “single-peaked preference,” which is indicated in bold for each
group in Table 5). Crucially, this preference automatically determines the
tax duty for the other groups. The workmen’s preference does not depend
on in-game negotiations: their desired rate is 16%, and uniformity will force
them to propose 16% for the entrepreneurs as well.
2. It is particularly remarkable that the preferred tax rates for the three different
groups tend to congregate around the same point. Where in the previous
situation the range between different rate levels greatly enlarged (e.g., entre-
preneurs paying 35%, the rest contributing 22%), the confines of uniformity
limit this range to only 2% (between 14 and 16, see Table 5, marked in bold).
It is easy to see how any majority coalition would put taxation within that
range. Henceforth, the majority under a generality will more heavily favor
the median voter’s preference.78
3. Whereas under an unrestrained majority rule the optimal options for one
group represent severe losses for another group, here the optimal numbers
for each group separately are also profitable options for the other group.
Moreover, the “minimum optimum” (entrepreneurs favoring 14%) and the
“maximum optimum” (workers favoring 16%) both include profitable
options for all the other groups (see Table 5).
Table 5. Distributive options under tax uniformity
Revenue
Spending
Value
Shares per Entrepreneur
(input vs. output)
Shares per Fisherman
(input vs. output)
Shares per Workman
(input vs. output)
10% tax 11.000 200 and 183 (–17) 175 and 183 (8) 125 and 183 (58)
11% tax 13.000 220 and 216 (–4) 192 and 216 (24) 137 and 216 (78)
12% tax 15.000 240 and 250 (10) 210 and 250 (40) 150 and 250 (100)
13% tax 17.500 260 and 291 (31) 227 and 291 (64) 162 and 291 (129)
14% tax 19.000 280 and 316 (36) 245 and 316 (71) 175 and 316 (141)
15% tax 20.000 300 and 333 (33) 262 and 333 (71) 187 and 333 (146)
16% tax 21.000 320 and 350 (30) 280 and 350 (70) 200 and 350 (150)
17% tax 21.500 340 and 358 (18) 297 and 358 (60) 212 and 358 (145)
18% tax 22.000 360 and 366 (6) 315 and 366 (51) 225 and 366 (141)
19% tax 22.500 380 and 375 (–5) 332 and 375 (43) 238 and 375 (137)
20% tax 23.000 400 and 383 (–17) 350 and 383 (33) 250 and 383 (133)
Note: Optimal tax level for each group is indicated in bold.
78. Buchanan & Congleton, Politics by Principle, supra note 16 at 137.
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Naturally, the precise economic effects of uniformity undisputedly depend on
the distribution of income throughout the population, the preferences of others
regarding the activities of the state, and the value of the public goods produced.
These will vary over time and place, so the members of both the township
and other political communities (like us) have an interest in the general working
properties of uniformity:
1. Uniformity minimizes fiscal exploitation. No player can abuse its political
power by purely taking from the relatively powerless. With a symmetrical
distribution of tax shares, any rise in taxes on minorities will be paralleled
by an equal proportionate rise in tax shares on the player’s own group
(see Figure 1). Due to this incentive-aligning quality, uniformity promotes
a rudimentary form of fairness: those decisive in the fiscal process will treat
others in ways they would like to be treated themselves.79
2. The majority will extend the size of the budget only to the point at which
their marginal benefits equal their marginal taxes.80 Since governments
now properly internalize their costs, overall, loss-making projects (see
coalition “social justice”) are equally costly for majorities and overinvest-
ment is discouraged.81
3. Although there is no assurance that each application will always be beneficial
to each income group, since such benefits depend on specific political-
economic particularities, uniformity, as a general rule, promotes positive-
sum games. Under the symmetrical assignment of tax shares throughout
the constituency, options that appear profitable to the government have a
relatively high chance of being beneficial to those outside the realm of
power (see Figure 1). As such, the uniform application of tax rates through-
out the constituency promotes general efficiency, as it spurs majorities to opt
for policies that hinge on the direction of the Pareto frontier.82
Constitutional choice is a setting where individuals have imperfect knowledge
of their position under future applications of a rule. Because of this lack of
identified interest, they will opt for rules compatible with general notions of
criteria of “fairness” and “efficiency.” Tax uniformity satisfies that constitutional
test: it minimizes the risk of fiscal rulemaking where some can realize fiscal gains
by putting high burdens on others and, conversely, promotes policy whereby a
broad range of individuals can profit from public finance.
79. Buchanan & Congleton, Politics by Principle, supra note 16; Richard A Epstein, Simple Rules
for a Complex World (Harvard University Press, 1995) at 138.
80. Buchanan, Logical Foundations, supra note 20 at 142.
81. Gwartney, supra note 29 at 18; Buchanan & Congleton, Politics by Principle, supra note 18.
82. Richard A Epstein, “Can Anyone Beat the Flat Tax?” (2002) 19 Social Philosophy and Policy
140. Efficiency is conceptualized here as the Pareto norm: no one can be made better off with-
out someone else being made worse off. Gaus,On Philosophy, supra note 44. Uniformity com-
pensates for the departure from the unanimity requirement within a majoritarian democracy.
Buchanan, Logical Foundations, supra note 20 at 145-46.
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2. Lump-sum taxation
The second option is the equal distribution of an absolute number, often coined
“lump-sum taxes.” The expected outcomes are a function of the rules defining
how majorities can make valid fiscal legislation. Looking at the township, which
pattern of outcomes can be predicted when majorities are restrained by the
universal distribution of an absolute number? In Table 6, the rows represent
the same spending value (and thus gross individual benefits) from public action
as in the previous option, yet now this is generated by the universal exaction of
an equal amount of money (see “input” in Table 6, indicating the same number
for each group in each row).
Figure 2 shows the consequence of demanding an equal absolute number from
each group: each tax policy generates the same absolute amount of net benefits
for each group.
Table 6 depicts the feasible options for each group for lump-sum taxation,
under the general observation of both increasing and decreasing marginal utility
(see “spending value”) of public goods. The optimal tax level for each group—a
contribution of 266—is indicated in bold.
The distributional outcomes generated by lump-sum taxes have much in
common with those generated by uniform taxation. The optimal tax level for each
Table 6. Distributive options under lump-sum taxation
Revenue
Spending
Value
Shares per Entrepreneur
(input vs. output)
Shares per Fisherman
(input vs. output)
Shares per Workman
(input vs. output)
10% tax
10.000
11.000 166 and 183 (17) 166 and 183 (17) 166 and 183 (17)
11% tax
11.000
13.000 183 and 216 (33) 183 and 216 (33) 183 and 216 (33)
12% tax
12.000
15.000 200 and 250 (50) 200 and 250 (50) 200 and 250 (50)
13% tax
13.000
17.500 216 and 291 (75) 216 and 291 (75) 216 and 291 (75)
14% tax
14.000
19.000 233 and 316 (83) 233 and 316 (83) 233 and 316 (83)
15% tax
15.000
20.000 250 and 333 (83) 250 and 333 (83) 250 and 333 (83)
16% tax
16.000
21.000 266 and 350 (84) 266 and 350 (84) 266 and 350 (84)
17% tax
17.000
21.500 283 and 358 (75) 283 and 358 (75) 283 and 358 (75)
18% tax
18.000
22.000 300 and 366 (66) 300 and 366 (66) 300 and 366 (66)
19% tax
19.000
22.500 316 and 375 (59) 316 and 375 (59) 316 and 375 (59)
20% tax
20.000
23.000 333 and 383 (50) 333 and 383 (50) 333 and 383 (50)
Note: Optimal tax level for each group is indicated in bold.
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group is single-peaked (each group has only one best option), and discretion over
another’s tax liability is foreclosed: what is optimal for one group automatically
generates the tax duty for the other groups. Even more, the optimal tax level
now is simply the same for each group (266, the equivalent of a 16% tax in
the previous example). Lump-sum contributions put taxation on a par with
markets, as taxes function as “shadow prices for goods and services provided
by the state”83 and henceforth limit overinvestment.84
Yet a careful analysis of Table 6 reveals that some change did occur. The
optimal tax level under lump sum taxes asks 266 from each group. Compared
to a uniform tax, which generates the same output value for each member
(350; see 16% row in Table 5), lump-sum taxation involves a tax cut for entre-
preneurs of 54 (they pay 320 under a uniform tax) and a tax raise up to 66 for
workmen (who pay 200 under the uniform tax). From a comparative perspective,
a lump-sum tax acts as a transfer of liabilities to the lower-income groups. But
even when assessed on its own merits, taxation in absolute numbers fails to hold
up as “equal treatment.” Due to its insensitivity regarding how much a person
earns, taxation in absolute numbers is harsh on the workmen: 250 out of
1,250 vs. 250 out of 2,000 for the entrepreneurs.85 Although no one can precisely
draw the curve, most people believe in the soundness of diminishing marginal
utility of income: the first dollar earned has a higher subjective value than the
2,000th dollar earned.86 Admitting the variance in interpersonal utility curves,
at a general level, one can nonetheless state that under lump-sum taxes, the lower
an individual’s income flow, the more value they will transfer to the common
fund.87 Because of this, the first working property of lump-sum taxes is—again,
Figure 2. Distributive options under lump sum taxation
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83. Barbara H Fried, “The Puzzling Case for Proportional Taxation” (1999) 2 Chapman L Rev 157
at 160 [Fried, “The Puzzling Case”].
84. Buchanan & Congleton, Politics by Principle, supra note 16 at 93.
85. A seminal insight of this kind convinced Mill to state that everybody should bear the same
utility loss and to elaborate his “equal sacrifice” principle. See John Stuart Mill, Principles
of Political Economy: with some of their applications to social philosophy, 7th ed (Longmans,
1909) at 804.
86. Epstein, “Can Anyone Beat the Flat Tax?” supra note 82 at 160; ERA Seligman, “Progressive
Taxation in Theory and Practice” (1908) 9 American Economic Association Quarterly 1 at
216; H Peyton Young, “Progressive Taxation and Equal Sacrifice” (1990) 80:1 American
Economic Rev 253.
87. In other words, the estimation is that the interpersonal variance in utility curves does not suggest
that individuals, choosing the constitutional principles of taxation, would deny this insight.
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generally speaking—that they create at least some distributional bias in favor of
the higher-income groups. A second operational element is, however, more
relevant to the current discussion. Not only do lump-sum taxes entail a distribu-
tional bias, at the extreme, they empower the richest group to squeeze the lowest-
income groups dry. Even in our fairly income-even township, the entrepreneurs
and fishermen can put the tax at 1,250, to the detriment of the workmen. Now
imagine the workmen earn 1,000, the fishermen 20,000 and the entrepreneurs
50,000. Here, the latter two groups can put the lump sum at 1,000, thereby
expropriating all income from the workmen without experiencing severe losses
themselves. Interestingly, such an unfair practice is ruled out under uniformity:
taking everything from the workmen is checked by the prospect of being stripped
oneself.88 Hence, due to the unequal effect (caused by its blindness regarding
how much a person earns), not only will a lump-sum tax realize distributive gains
for the higher-income groups, when they fall outside the dominant coalition,
lump-sum taxes put the lowest-income groups at the political mercy of the rest
of the constituency. From a contractarian-constitutional perspective, when
selecting procedures leading to outcomes that are acceptable to various positions,
parties will want to prevent this risk.
3. Progressive taxation
The higher one’s income flow, the less one is affected by an absolute
contribution. But does this search for an equal burden (relative to one’s holdings)
not demand us to go further than a universal rate structure?89 Does 250 realize the
same burden for someone who earns 1,000 as 2,500 does for someone who gains
10,000? Indeed, the negative marginal utility of income has also been advanced
to justify progressive taxation: the higher the income, the less one sacrifices, and
thus the higher the required marginal rate.90 Additionally, if not a translation of
equal treatment, progressive taxation’s justification lies in redistribution. We do
not need to treat people equally, we need to favor the least fortunate by progres-
sive rates on the more fortunate, arguably an application of the demands of
fairness.91
88. Majorities could do this when they are able to discriminate in terms of spending, which they are
not in my example. See Geoffrey Brennan & James M Buchanan, The Power to Tax:
Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution (Liberty Fund, 2000).
89. Young, supra note 86.
90. Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, “The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to
Policy Recommendations” (2011) 25:4 J Economic Perspectives 165; Hettich & Winer, supra
note 6.
91. David G Duff, “Tax Policy and the Virtuous Sovereign: Dworkonian Equality and
Redistributive Taxation” in Monica Bhandari, ed, The Philosophical Foundations of Tax
Law 167 at 178, 185; Ronald Dworkin, “What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Resources”
(1981) 10 Philosophy & Public Affairs 283 at 337; Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue:
The Theory and Practice of Equality (Harvard University Press, 2002) at 100; Epstein,
“Can Anyone Beat the Flat Tax?”, supra note 82 at 161; Joseph J Thorndike & Dennis J
Ventry Jr, Tax Justice: The Ongoing Debate (Rowman & Littlefield, 2002).
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Whether advanced as an application of the “equal treatment” doctrine—i.e., as
a means to realize an equal relative burden on the higher and lower incomes—or
to operationalize redistribution, two preliminary nuances are in place regarding
these foundations of progressive rates. There is a difference between the distri-
bution of income and well-being, more broadly construed. The latter also
includes nonpecuniary benefits like health, a happy family life, leisure, and
bodily integrity. Not only do nonpecuniary benefits not move in lockstep
proportion with measurable income, but these components are also skewed across
persons.92 While a flat tax will ask 10 times as much from someone with 10 times
the income, no one would insist that taken pecuniary and nonpecuniary sources of
utility together, this person is 10 times better off. Flat taxes, applicable only to
one source of well-being, income, will be particularly harsh on those who have a
lot of it; hence, flat taxes will realize a systematic redistribution from the high-
income groups to the rest.93 Additionally, even if we assume that the pecuniary
tax base is a perfect indication of well-being, flat taxes, simply by asking multiple
times the amount from the higher incomes, may well be redistributive. As became
apparent in the township, the most likely option (a rate of 15%) generates a net
benefit of 33 for the entrepreneurs versus 146 for the workmen (see Table 5). In a
polity with a fairly equal division of income, a flat tax yields 4.5 times as much
benefit for the lower than for the higher income groups. If marginal utility is the
justification for progressive rates, the dollars the workmen earn would need to
yield more than 4.5 times as much subjective value as the dollars the entrepre-
neurs earn. As other scholars underline,94 for the equal-burden principle to re-
quire progressive rates, the marginal utility curve would need to decrease in a
rather impressively sharp fashion. In any case, the utility of income will decrease
far more slowly than the utility for specific goods, as it has to be measured by the
utility of the most desired good yet unpurchased.95 Hence, uniform taxation may
well be sufficient to satisfy the equal-sacrifice principle.
Our main worry is different. Even given a case for progressive rates, whether
founded in equal treatment or redistribution, this paper distinguishes between
theoretic ideals and expected outcomes once tax rules are unleashed in political
reality. It is possible that those deciding on the distribution of tax incidence will
be dedicated to the principle of marginal utility and the doctrine of equal sacrifice
when voting on tax brackets and tax rates. They might also be inspired by
theoretic schemes of redistribution, stating the point at which the richer classes
should transfer higher amounts to the common fund. But I started with the
observation that political groups are often driven by more profane considerations.
Progressivity crucially alters the nature of the alternatives that appear on an
individual’s calculus. In particular, the deviation from the equal-rate principle
92. Epstein, “Can Anyone Beat the Flat Tax?”, supra note 82 at 152.
93. Ibid at 157.
94. Young, supra note 86 at 255; Paul A Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis (Harvard
University Press, 1947) at 247.
95. Epstein, “Can Anyone Beat the Flat Tax?”, supra note 82 at 169.
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and the ability to tax other groups at higher rates “open up the risk that the
system of taxation will be abused and perverted and thus transformed into an
instrument of confiscation that some individuals can wield against others.”96
Going back to the township, the constraint of progressivity allows the workmen
and fishermen to, say, put a rate of 15% on the “first” 1,750 any person earns and
a universal rate of 76% on the second bracket, above 1,750. Note that this would
create exactly the same distribution as under the “social justice” coalition:
workers pay 5,000, fishermen 7,000, and entrepreneurs 12,800, with societal
overinvestment and severe losses for the entrepreneurs reoccurring in the public
domain. Table 7 shows distribution shares with a spending value of 400 per
capita.
Adam Smith raised the requirement that the “tax which each individual is
bound to pay ought to be certain, and not arbitrary.”97 In this regard, our example
above signals progressivity’s weaknesses compared to the uniformity account.
Moreover, the legislative liberty to tax different income brackets at different rates
will generate asymmetrical distributions of tax shares between different income
groups. As the choice of one’s own tax liability does not automatically determine
the excise applicable to other income groups, politically dominant coalitions are
now at liberty to realize gains by surtaxing others. As the example suggests,
progressivity incentivizes lower- and middle-income groups to maximize profits
by shifting the burden of public action onto the high-earning minority.98 This
reignites, albeit to a more limited degree, the issues against which uniformity
appeared as a check. While uniformity realizes efficiency, fairness, and a limited
form of redistribution at minimal discretionary costs, progressivity opens up the
fiscal powers, and with it the risk for fiscal exploitation, overinvestment, and
inefficiency (meaning the rule does not promote outcomes that are beneficial to
all members). Nonetheless, compared with the practice of fiscal exemptions
and the prevailing legal arrangements, progressive rates, when applied universally,
clearly represent an improvement. First, groups are only allowed to differentiate
the applicable rate on the basis of one element: income. Second, the differentia-
tion of fiscal duties is clearly limited, as it only applies to a proportion of the
income of a specific group; that is, the portion that exceeds a specific benchmark
Table 7. Distribution Under Progressivity
Group Outcome from Public Action
Workmen 150
Fishermen 50
Entrepreneurs –240
96. Ibid at 143.
97. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (The Modern Library, 1937).
98. Epstein, “Can Anyone Beat the Flat Tax?”, supra note 82 at 164.
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cutoff, here 1,750. This means that under progressivity, fiscal extraction becomes
more visible as it demands comparatively high rates. In current politics, progres-
sive rates on all income would be a step toward more generality and represents a
reasonable account of generality.99
The essential question that remains is thus whether risk-averse contractors
with limited knowledge about their future position prefer the “political security”
of not being discriminated against or the economic benefits and the “limited”
redistributive effects offered by uniformity, or whether they opt for “socioeconomic
security” for low- and middle-income groups to benefit from the distributive bias
delivered by progressivity at the costs of extended fiscal powers. Answering this
question requires gauging both the negative (e.g., desincentivizing effects of
progressive rates) and positive (e.g., redistribution might boost the opportunities
of the least fortunate) spillovers of both institutions, and thus falls outside the
scope of this article. The true answer may even be beyond the scope of theory,
as the trade-off it implies can be performed only by real people. After all, rational
choice models are nothing but a simulation of real choice.
4. On distributive justice and taxation
Fried is right: to the extent that distributive justice is about proclaiming
philosophical ideals, tax uniformity fails to be any account of justice. The
insensitivity that tax uniformity generates with respect to each person’s biological
endowment100 or height of income101 seems to run against the core of many
theories of justice. That said, Amartya Sen claims that theorizing about justice
needs to focus on how social structures actually work—not on how we imagine
they work in thought experiments.102 This paper builds on political reality and
behavioral insights that indicate that fiscal decision-making is no pure realization
of a philosophical ideal, but often results from the attempts of individuals who
are decisive in the process to attain their own self-interest. On this account, tax
justice is not something “out there” waiting to be objectified by a benevolent
policymaker. If tax justice is ever to be realized, it will “emerge” from a process
in which multiple mainly self-interested agents settle the distribution of tax shares
against a prevailing set of rules. I intended to find procedural constraints that are
“robust” to deal with self-interested political action and yield results compatible
with rudimentary conceptions of fairness and efficiency. Justice, according to this
nonideal account, is not some independent ideal but relates to the internal quality
of the very rules that will determine how that process takes place. Theorizing on
99. Melkevik, supra note 74 at 430-33.
100. Dworkin, “What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Resources”, supra note 91; John E Roemer,
“A Pragmatic Theory of Responsibility for the Egalitarian Planner” (1993) 22:2 Philosophy
and Public Affairs 146; Stuart White, “The Egalitarian Earnings Subsidy Scheme” (1999) 29:4
British Journal of Political Science 601.
101. Ingrid Robeyns, “Having Too Much” in Jack Knight & Melissa Schwatberg, eds, Wealth:
NOMOS LVIII (NYU Press Scholarship Online, 2016); Martin O’Neill, “Survey Article:
Philosophy and Public Policy After Piketty” (2017) 25:3 J Political Philosophy 343.
102. Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Harvard University Press, 2009) at 22, 67, 86.
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fiscal justice involves screening which effect competing tax rules will exert on
those who are in a position to determine the distribution of fiscal shares.
Rules that are “just” are the ones that generate outcomes that are “broadly accept-
able” and appear beneficial to all prospective positions.
This article illustrates how generality-as-uniformity satisfies this constitu-
tional test, as it generates fiscal outcomes that benefit those inside and outside
the realm of power, alongside generalized criteria of fairness and efficiency
(displayed in Figure 1 and Table 5). Due to its built-in constraint, these working
properties flow endogenously from the rule itself, whereby fiscal harm to others
is likely to damage the rule-maker. Choosing behind a veil of uncertainty,
generality-as-uniformity thus assures participants that those deciding on the dis-
tribution of fiscal shares will produce a policy pattern acceptable to all players,
regardless of their position. To the extent that distributive justice entails assuring
an outcome that “all can live with,”103 tax uniformity stands as an account of
justice. In that regard, Fried is wrong.
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